Brumfield v. Sanders by unknown
2000 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
11-14-2000 
Brumfield v. Sanders 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2000 
Recommended Citation 
"Brumfield v. Sanders" (2000). 2000 Decisions. 235. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2000/235 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2000 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed November 14, 2000 
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DERR-BLAKENEY; M. JANE HUFF; CARLA MEYERS; 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
On Appeal From the United States District Court 
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. 98-cv-01482) 
District Judge: Honorable Malcolm Muir 
 
Argued: October 6, 2000 
 
Before: BARRY, WEIS, and ROSENN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed November 14, 2000) 
 
       Michael Marrone, Esquire (Argued) 
       Marc F. Lovecchio 
       Campana, Campana & 
        Lovecchio, LLP 
       602 Pine Street 
       Williamsport, PA 17701 
        Counsel for P. Brian Brumfield 
 
 
  
       Dulce Donovan, Esquire (Argued) 
       Assistant United States Attorney 
       Federal Building 
       228 Walnut Street 
       Harrisburg, PA 17108 
        Counsel for United States of 
       America 
 
OPINION ANNOUNCING THE JUDGMENT 
OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal presents the uncommon scenario of a civil 
suit in a state court by a federal employee againstfive of 
his fellow employees, all of whom were employed by the 
United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons 
("BOP"). The plaintiff, P. Brian Brumfield, filed his 
complaint in state court alleging that he and allfive 
individual defendants were employed by BOP at the 
Allenwood Federal Correctional Facility ("FCI Allenwood"). 
The complaint alleged state tort law claims of conspiracy, 
prima facie or intentional tort, abuse of pr ocess and 
defamation against all five defendants. Brumfield's claims 
are predicated on written affidavits and oral statements 
given by the defendants in a 1996 investigation by the BOP 
Office of Internal Affairs ("OIA") with respect to Brumfield's 
unprofessional conduct. 
 
As a result of the investigation, the war den disciplined 
Brumfield, who appealed the warden's action to the Merit 
Systems Protection Board ("MSPB"). The appeal was 
resolved by agreement. Brumfield then sued the individual 
defendants in the Court of Common Pleas, Union County, 
Pennsylvania. The defendants removed the case to the 
United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1442(a)(1), which 
allows officers of United States agencies to r emove civil 
actions against them to a federal district court. Thereafter, 
the United States moved under the Westfall Act1 to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The relevant provision of the W estfall Act states: 
 
       The remedy against the United States pr ovided by [the Federal Tort 
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substitute itself for the individual defendants, asserting 
that the individual defendants were, at all r elevant times, 
acting within the scope of their employment. The District 
Court dismissed the complaint on the recommendation and 
report of the magistrate judge. Brumfield timely appealed. 
We affirm, although on the primary issue on appeal we do 
so on grounds different than those of the District Court.2 
 
I. 
 
On appeal, the appellant makes three ar guments. First, 
he argues that the district court erred in denying 
Brumfield's request for discovery on the scope of 
employment issue. Second, he contends that the district 
court wrongly determined that the individual defendants' 
challenged actions occurred within the scope of their 
employment. Finally, he maintains that the District Court 
erred in predicting that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
would not recognize a cause of action for prima facie or 
intentional tort. 
 
II. 
 
The threshold question in this appeal pertains to whether 
the plaintiff 's claim of tortious conduct occurred within the 
scope of the individual defendants' employment. Brumfield 
acknowledges that a federal employee is absolutely immune 
from common law claims of tortious conduct occurring 
within the scope of his or her employment. The W estfall 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       Claims Act] for injury . . . resulting fr om the negligent or 
wrongful 
       act . . . of any employee of the government acting within the scope 
       of his office or employment is exclusive of any other civil action 
or 
       proceeding for money damages arising by r eason of the same 
       subject matter against the employee . . . . 
 
28 U.S.C. S 2679. 
 
2. "An appellate court may affirm a r esult reached by the District Court 
on different reasons, as long as the record supports the judgement." 
Guthrie v. Lady Jane Collieries, Inc., 722 F .2d 1141, 1145 n. 1 (3d Cir. 
1983)(citing Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245, 58 S.Ct. 154, 157, 
82 L.Ed. 224 (1937)). 
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Act, also known as the Federal Employees Liability Reform 
and Tort Compensation Act, provides federal employees 
acting within the scope of their employment absolute 
immunity from damage liability on state law tort claims. 
See Melo v. Hafer, 13 F.3d 736, 739 (3d Cir. 1994). Under 
the Westfall Act, the Attorney General of the United States 
may certify, as was done in this case, that the employee 
was acting within the scope of his or her employment, and 
request that the United States be substituted as the only 
defendant.3  See 28 U.S.C. S 2679(d)(1). However, the 
plaintiff correctly argues that certification by the Attorney 
General is only prima facie evidence that the alleged 
injurious conduct occurred within the scope of the federal 
employee's duties. See Schrob v. Catterson, 967 F.2d 926, 
929 (3d. Cir. 1992); 28 U.S.C. S 2679(d)(2). Brumfield, 
therefore, requested of the District Court that he be 
permitted reasonable discovery fr om the individual 
defendants. The District Court, however, denied this 
request and decided without discovery and without a 
hearing on the question that the defendants wer e acting 
within the scope of their employment. 
 
In denying discovery, the District Court noted that 
Brumfield had already engaged in extensive discovery 
relating to the scope of employment of the individual 
defendants in the MSPB proceeding and that he should not 
be permitted to duplicate those efforts in the present 
proceeding. In permitting the gover nment to substitute the 
United States as sole defendant, the District Court found 
that this argument had considerable merit in light of the 
absence of any response by the plaintif f. We believe that the 
District Court's rationale in the earlier stage of the 
proceedings logically applies with equal for ce to the 
plaintiff 's efforts to secur e discovery at this stage. 
 
Moreover, the Attorney General's certification appears to 
have been based on the plaintiff 's complaint. The 
certification states, in relevant part: 
 
       I have read the complaint and . . . upon the basis of 
       the information now available to me with r espect to the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The Attorney General has delegated her certification authority to the 
United States Attorneys. See 28 C.F.R.S 510; 28 C.F.R. S 15.3. 
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       incidents referred to therein, I am of the opinion that 
       the [individual] defendants . . . were acting within the 
       scope of their employment . . . pursuant to an official 
       government investigation at the time of the conduct 
       alleged in the complaint. 
 
Brumfield v. Sanders, 50 F.Supp.2d 381, 385 (W.D. Pa. 
1999). In a later affidavit, the Attorney General reiterated 
that her conclusion that the individual defendants were 
acting within the scope of their employment was based on 
the allegations in Brumfield's complaint.4 The District Court 
opined: 
 
       Permitting additional discovery when the Attor ney 
       General's certification is not based on a dif ferent 
       understanding of the facts than is reflected in 
       Brumfield's complaint would undermine the intent of 
       the Westfall Act to protect federal employees from 
       responding to state law tort claims. 
 
Brumfield nowhere contends that the Attor ney General 
misunderstood the allegations in the complaint. Our 
standard of review of questions concer ning the scope or 
opportunity for discovery is for abuse of discr etion. See 
Country Floors Inc. v. Gepner & Ford, 930 F.2d 1056, 1062 
(3d Cir. 1992). We see no abuse of discretion in the District 
Court's refusal to permit additional discovery. 
 
The District Court's discovery ruling does not end the 
matter, however, because Brumfield argues that the District 
Court erred as a matter of law when it held that the 
individual defendants acted within the scope of their 
employment during the OIA investigation. It is undisputed 
that whether they did or not is a matter of Pennsylvania 
state law. Pennsylvania has accepted the Restatement 
(Second) of Agency's definition of conduct "within the scope 
of employment." See Butler v. Flo-Ron V ending Co., 383 Pa. 
Super. 633, 646 (Pa.Super. 1989); Aliota v. Graham, 984 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Specifically, the Attorney General based her conclusion on the 
allegation that the warden encouraged female employees to report 
unprofessional conduct by male supervisors and that the defendants 
prepared the challenged written statements at the request of OIA 
investigators during the course of an official investigation. 
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F.2d 1350, 1358 (3rd Cir. 1993). According to the 
Restatement, "conduct is within the scope of employment if, 
but only if: (a) it is the kind [the employee] is employed to 
perform; (b) it occurs substantially within the authorized 
time and space limits [and] (c) it is actuated, at least in 
part, by a purpose to serve the master . . . ." Restatement 
(Second) Agency S 228. 
 
Brumfield does not dispute that factors (a) and (b) are 
met in this case, but he contends that, because the 
defendants' accusations were motivated by personal 
animosity toward him, they were not intended to "serve the 
master." This argument, however , does not comport with 
Pennsylvania agency law. This Court has previously held 
that under Pennsylvania law, the mere existence of a 
personal motivation is insufficient to relieve the employer 
from liability where the conduct also benefitted him and 
was within the scope of employment generally. Eisenberg v. 
Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 783 (3rd Cir . 1985) (citing Yaindl v. 
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 281 Pa.Super. 560, 575-76 (not followed 
on other grounds)(1981)); Restatement (Second) of Agency 
S 236 (1958)). Here, the statements and affidavits of the 
individual defendants were given at the behest of OIA 
officials to assist them in their official investigation. 
Personal animosity, if any existed, was subsumed by the 
benefit that inured to employees generally at the Allenwood 
institution. If the OIA investigation revealed unprofessional 
conduct by Brumfield, the District Court noted that 
"appropriate discipline could be meted out and 
unprofessional conduct by a supervisor halted." Brumfield, 
50 F.Supp.2d at 385. 
 
Brumfield also contends that "the course of employment" 
does not include commission of unlawful acts or acts 
contrary to orders, policies, procedur es and standards of 
the BOP.5 Brumfield maintains that the individual 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The cases Brumfield cites to support this pr oposition construe the 
Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act, specifically, when an injury 
occurs "in the course of employment" under the act. See Kozak v. Joseph 
Reilly Coal Co., 141 Pa.Super. 413 (1940); Garrahan v. Glaen Alden Coal 
Co., 135 Pa.Super. 307 (1939). They do not discuss Pennsylvania's 
common law of agency and are not relevant to this case. 
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defendants "lied during the course of an official 
investigation and lied on false affidavits." Thus, he argues 
that their actions were outside the scope of employment 
and therefore not protected by the W estfall Act. This 
argument too was properly rejected by the District Court. 
The Pennsylvania Superior Court has specifically held that 
"[the] liability of the employer may extend even to 
intentional or criminal acts committed by the servant." 
Butler, 383 Pa.Super. at 646. See also, Aliota, 984 F.2d at 
1358 ("In the absence of any contrary decisions or 
pronouncements by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, we 
predict that that court would follow [Butler]"). 
 
Although the individual defendants were r equired to 
provide only truthful responses to questions posed in the 
investigation, "an act, although forbidden or done in a 
forbidden manner, may be within the scope of 
employment." Restatement (Second) of Agency S 230; Aliota, 
984 F.2d at 1358. Under Pennsylvania law, even 
unauthorized acts may be within the scope of employment 
"if they are clearly incidental to the master's business." 
Shuman Estate v. Weber, 276 Pa.Super . 209, 216 (1980). 
Here, Brumfield's complaint asserts that during the course 
of the investigation, the individual defendants wer e 
encouraged to come forward and asked to and did sign 
affidavits which he alleged contained false facts about him. 
Thus, even assuming the statements were false, plaintiff 's 
allegation squarely makes the individual defendants' 
conduct incidental to BOP's business, and Brumfield 
proffered no evidence that the defendants' conduct was not 
motivated at least in part by a purpose to serve the BOP. 
 
Finally, according to the Restatement, : 
 
       it may be found to be within the scope of employment 
       of a person . . . to accuse another of wrongful conduct 
       or report to others the supposed wrongful conduct of 
       [another] employee . . . . A servant having a duty to 
       make such reports . . . to his employer . . . may subject 
       his employer to liability for his untruthful statements. 
 
Restatement (Second) of Agency S 247 cmt. e. See also, 
Aliota, 984 F.2d at 1359 (predicting that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court would adopt Restatement S 247). As the 
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district court noted, "[BOP's] policy makes clear that it was 
within the scope of Defendants' employment duties to 
cooperate with investigators of the [OIA] and provide 
potential information regarding any unprofessional conduct 
by Brumfield." Brumfield, 50 F . Supp.2d at 384. Thus, the 
defendants in this case conformed to the very duty 
contemplated by Restatement S 247 comment e, supra. We 
therefore conclude that the statements made by the 
defendants, even if false, were within the scope of their 
employment. Accordingly, the District Court committed no 
error in ruling that the defendants' conduct during the OIA 
investigation was within the scope of their employment. 
 
III. 
 
The primary and final issue in this appeal is Brumfield's 
contention that under Pennsylvania law, the individual 
defendants committed an intentional tort as defined in 
Section 870 of the Restatement (Second) of T orts and the 
District Court therefore erred in dismissing his complaint. 
Although the District Court dismissed all of the defendant's 
underlying claims against the United States, Brumfield only 
argues on appeal that it was error to dismiss his claim for 
intentional or prima facie tort as set forth in Count II of his 
complaint. This is consistent with his position in the 
District Court, where he objected only to the dismissal of 
his claim for intentional tort. The District Court r ejected his 
objection, predicting that when faced with the question, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not recognize a cause 
of action for intentional or prima facie tort as set forth in 
the Restatement. Under our analysis of the claim, there is 
no need for us to predict whether the Supr eme Court of 
Pennsylvania would recognize such a claim. 
 
The Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") bars actions against 
the United States for wrongful use of civil pr oceedings and 
defamation.6 Claims "arising out of . . . libel, slander, 
misrepresentation [or] deceit" ar e excepted from the United 
States's general waiver of sovereign immunity. 28 U.S.C. 
S 2680(h). Thus, defamation suits against the United States 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. 28 U.S.C. S 2680(h) creates exceptions to the general waiver of 
sovereign immunity set forth in 28 U.S.C. S 1346. 
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are prohibited. In fact, cases from other circuits make clear 
that an individual who is defamed by a federal employee 
acting within the scope of his or her employment has no 
remedy due to the protections affor ded by the Westfall Act 
and the FTCA. See B & A Marine Co., Inc v. American 
Foreign Shipping Co., Inc., 23 F.3d 709, 714-715 (2d Cir. 
1994); Alviles v. Lutz, 887 F.2d 1046 (10th Cir. 1989).7 
 
In Count IV of his complaint, charging defamation, 
Brumfield alleged, inter alia, that the individual defendants 
"sign[ed] affidavits containing false facts" about Brumfield, 
"submitted written false statements of alleged misconduct" 
by Brumfield, and gave false oral statements about 
Brumfield to investigating OIA agents. This claim was 
dismissed in the District Court and was not appealed. 
Without any additional allegations, Count II incorporates by 
reference averments of the complaint, but asserts that the 
"defendants' conduct and statements as afor esaid are 
actionable as an intentional tort under Pennsylvania law 
and pursuant to S 870 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts." Brumfield's complaint does not allege any 
underlying facts in Count II that make his intentional tort 
claim different from his alr eady dismissed defamation claim 
or his conspiracy claim in Count I. Count IV , the 
defamation claim, contained no independent allegations of 
defamation but relies entirely on "the previous averments of 
the complaint," including Count I and Count II. Thus, the 
essence of his intentional tort cause of action is that the 
individual defendants made false statements about him 
that caused him economic harm and damage to his 
reputation. As such, it is precluded byS 2680. 
 
Cases in other jurisdictions support our analysis."In 
examining a complaint, we are bound to look beyond the 
literal meaning of the language to ascertain the r eal cause 
of the complaint." Jimenez-Nieves v. United States, 682 F.2d 
1, 6 (1st Cir. 1982). In Jimenez-Nieves , the court rejected a 
claim for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages arising 
from the erroneous dishonoring of a Social Security check. 
Noting that the dishonoring of the check "implicitly 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Of course, defamation committed by a federal employee acting outside 
the scope of his or her employment may be actionable. 
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communicated defamatory statements about [the] plaintiff," 
then-Judge Breyer concluded that the claim"resound[ed] in 
the heartland of the tort of defamation" and was barred by 
S 2680. Id. at 6. 
 
In Hoesl v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 1170 (N.D. Cal. 
1978), aff 'd on different grounds per curiam, 629 F.2d 586 
(9th Cir. 1980), a government employee sued the United 
States and a government-employed psychiatrist for an 
allegedly negligent report stating that the plaintiff suffered 
a mental disability which made him unable to carry out his 
responsibilities. In holding that the substance of the 
plaintiff 's claim was defamation, the court stated that the 
defamation exception to the FTCA could not be avoided "by 
attaching a different label to the tort." Id. at 1174. 
 
IV. 
 
In conclusion, it is obvious upon examination of the 
complaint in this case, that the anatomy of Counts I, II and 
IV of Brumfield's complaint are the same. The effort to 
separate them by draping them with differ ent dress and 
labels fails to disguise their substantive similarity. For this 
reason, Count II, like Counts I and IV, is barred by the 
defamation exception to the FTCA. 
 
Accordingly, the District Court committed no error in 
dismissing the plaintiff 's entire complaint. The judgment of 
the District Court will be affirmed. Costs taxed against the 
appellant. 
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